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Comments
WAIVER OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
I. INTRODUCTION
Under what circumstances should the Nebraska court hold
that an appellant has waived his right to appeal by accepting
money damages awarded to him in the lower court? The object
of this comment is to suggest a workable solution to this problem.
II. BASIC RULE
All jurisdictions have followed the general rule that ac-
ceptance of the benefits of a lower court's decision constitutes
waiver of the right to appeal. The rule is usually stated to be
based on the reasoning that there has been an implied waiver
of the right to appeal, or conduct which amounts to estoppel.
However, as these terms are usually defined, very few cases
meet the requirements to constitute such waiver or estoppel.
Waiver involves intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a
known right,' or such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment of such right.2 To make out a case of implied
waiver of a legal right there must be a clear, unequivocal and
decisive act of the party showing such intent.3 Estoppel differs
from waiver as there is no need of intent to abandon or surrender
the right; however, there does have to be injury to the other
party4 arising out of reliance and a change of position.5 Even
though the courts usually list the above reasons, there are other
factors which seem to influence their decisions.
I Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. Ins. Co., 172 F. 364 (2d Cir. 1909); Vermillian
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 230 Mo. App. 993, 1004, 93 S.W.2d
45, 51 (1936).
2 Rand v. Morse, 289 F. 339, 344 (8th Cir. 1923); Dexter Yarn Co. v.
American Fabrics Co., 102 Conn. 529, 129 A. 527 (1925); Gibbs v.
Bergh, 51 S.D. 432, 441, 214 N.W. 838, 841 (1927).
3 Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins. Co., 99 F.2d 578, 579 (8th Cir. 1938).
4 Benson v. Borden, 174 Md. 202, 219, 198 A. 419, 427, 428 (1938) and
Johnston v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 130 Me. 143, 146, 154 A.
79, 80 (1931).
5 Wertz v. Shane, 216 Iowa 768, 249 N.W. 661 (1933); Lebold v. Inland
Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941); Garman v. Fitzgerald, 168
Miss. 532, 151 So. 726 (1934).
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First, the courts feel that the appellant is being inconsistent
by accepting the right given to him and then appealing therefrom.0
A decision produces a judgment right and if this right is accepted
the plaintiff should not argue that the right is incomplete.
The theory of inconsistency seems to be based on history and
runs throughout the law, being applied in most instances where
the party is given a choice.7
Second, where there is a possibility of a reversal, modifica-
tion, cross claim or cross appeal, the courts have been reluctant
to permit an appeal after acceptance of the benefits of a decree
because the court might not be able to replace the parties in their
respective positions if the plaintiff was held not to be entitled
to the relief awarded him. The defendant would thus have to
take his chances of collecting from the plaintiff. If the right
accepted is different from the right appealed from, jurisdictions
usually distinguish between a situation where a counter claim
could reduce the plaintiff's claim and those where the court
requires the defendant to proceed to collect his own claim, treat-
ing the counter claim as a completely separate action.
III. CONSIDERATIONS OF PROBLEM BY OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
A. STATUTORY REGULATION
A few states have adopted statutes controlling the situation,
however, they have not been very successful. Kentucky's stat-
ute8 provided that when a party recovered judgment for only
part of the demand sued for, the acceptance thereof would not
prevent him from prosecuting an appeal for as much of the de-
mand not recovered.9
0 See, San Bernardino County v. Riverside County, 135 Cal. 618, 67 P.
1047 (1902) and In re Shaver's Estate, 131 Cal. 219, 63 Pac. 340 (1900).
7 See, 31 C.J., Inconsistent, § 405 (1923) (for cases showing the general
area of the law where the term is applied).
8 KY. CIV. PRAC. CODE § 757 (Repealed in 1953).
9 Under this provision it was held that a plaintiff might accept volun-
tary satisfaction of the judgment without losing his right to appeal.
Combs v. Bates, 147 Ky. 849, 145 S.W. 759 (1912); Combs v. Bates,
150 Ky. 188, 150 S.W. 20 (1912); Nicholson v. Alvery, 150 Ky. 343,
150 S.W. 364 (1912); Hendrickson v. New Hughes Jellico Coal Co.,
172 Ky. 568, 189 S.W. 704 (1916); Dury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758,
57 S.W.2d 969 (1933).
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An Indiana statute'0 declares that the party obtaining a
judgment could not appeal after receiving money on such judg-
ment. Under this statute appellants, whether plaintiffs of de-
fendants, are held barred from appeal," however, in recent cases
the court has construed the statute narrowly.' 2
Lousiana's Practice Code13 states that the party against whom
judgment has been rendered cannot appeal if such judgment
has been confessed by him, or if he has acquiesced in the same,
by executing it voluntarily. In spite of the provisions of the
statute the court in the earlier cases held the statute applied
10 IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3201 (1933) Appeals may be taken from the
circuit courts and superior courts to the Supreme Court, by either
party, from all final judgments, except in actions originating before
a justice of the peace or mayor of a city where the amount in con-
troversy, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed fifty
dollars ($50.00); Provided, however, that this exception shall not
apply to prohibit an appeal in cases originating before a justice of
the peace or mayor of a city involving the validity of an ordinance
passed by an incorporated town or city. The party obtaining judg-
ment shall not take an appeal after receiving any money paid or
collected thereon.
11 See Clark v. Wright, 67 Ind. 224 (1879), where plaintiff in a fore-
closure proceedings credited by the amount for which he bid in
the property, was held bared from appealing from a provision
in the judgment declaring a prior lien in a defendant; Mutual Ben.
Life Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 163 Ind. 10, 71 N.E. 131 (1904), where it
was held that the statute operated even where the appellant accepted
payment for the accomodation of the appellee, and with a belief
that the acceptance should not affect his right of appeal. Wycoop v.
Laughner, 106 Ind. App. 457, 19 N.E.2d 486 (1939), where it was held
that the receipt of money after the appeal had the same effect under
the statute as the receipt of it before the appeal.
12 In State ex rel Jackson v. Middleton, 215 Ind. 219, 19 N.E.2d 470,
20 N.E.2d 509 (1939), one of the questions was whether the clerk
was a party in interest within the meaning of the statute and his
receiving payment of a judgment had the effect of placing it in the
hands of the real plaintiff. The opinion states that the statute is
merely declaratory of the common-law rule that a party cannot
accept the benefit of an adjudication and at the same time allege it
to be erroneous, "but like most general rules this has its exceptions
and it is accordingly Tecognized that an acceptance of an amount
to which the acceptee is entitled in any event does not estop him
from appealing or bringing error to the judgment or decree ordering
its payment." The court cited Indianapolis v. Stutz Motor Car Co.,
94 Ind. App. 211, 180 N.E. 497 (1932).
13 LA. CODE PRAC. ANN. art. 567 (Dart 1932) (This statute has not
been changed since 1875).
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to the plaintiff as well as to a defendant 4 and the statute was
strictly enforced.15 However, the court soon began to make
exceptions,' and in more recent cases it has been held that a
plaintiff may proceed to execute a judgment favorable to him
without losing his right to appeal.' 7
B. EXCEPTIONS TO BASIC RULE BY COURT DECISION
There are many exceptions carved from the basic rule, with
cases varying all the way from allowing an appeal because of
conditions of war and depression,'3 to dismissing an appeal
because appellant accepted $115.00 which the trial court awarded
him as administrator under the order for payment of attorney's
14 In Stimson v. O'Neal, 32 La. Ann. 947 (1880) it was held that where
a plaintiff sought to recover real estate from one who held possession
of it under tax sales, and the defendant abandoned all claim to the
property and left only an issue as to the plaintiff's right to the col-
lected rents and to damages for occupation, the plaintiff could not
prosecute an appeal from the judgment as to the latter issue because
it appeared that he had, after the judgment, begun to collect rents
from the tenants.
15 In Flowers v. Hughes, 46 La. Ann. 436, 15 So. 14 (1894) it was held
that a party to a partition proceeding who had been awarded a certain
sum as his share could not draw out a portion of it and appeal.
1' In Kaiser's Succession, 48 La. Ann. 973, 20 So. 184 (1896) the court
held that where there are two subjects of a judgment that are dis-
tinct, acquiescense in one will not defeat the appeal as to the other.
See also, Planters' Bank & T. Co. v. Savant, 172 La. 464, 134 So. 394
(1931); In Cory v. Askew, 169 La. 479, 125 So. 455 (1929) it was
held that acceptance of the payments awarded for five weeks dis-
ability at $20.00 per week did not bar his appeal for $20.00 per
week for 400 weeks. Accord; Chandler v. Oil Fields Gas Co., 2 La.
App. 778 (1925) & Glover v. Washington-Youree Hotel Co., 12 La.
App. 110, 125 So. 455 (1929).
17 In Foster & Glassell Co. v. Harrison, 173 La. 550, 138 So. 99 (1931)
the court stated that there was irreconcilable conflict between the
cases of Campbell v. Orillion, 3 La. Ann. 115 (1848) and Flowers v.
Hughes, 46 La. Ann. 436, 15 So. 14 (1894) and the later cases on the
same question, and the court stated that since there was such con-
flict the earlier cases must be considered as overruled. The court
then went on to adopt the rule that a plaintiff may proceed to execute
a judgment so far as it is favorable to him without dosing his right
to appeal. This case was followed by Barcelo v. Barcelo, 174 La.
81, 139 So. 765 (1932). See also, Hinricks & Son v. Lewis, 180 La.
898, 158 So. 11 (1934) where it was held that even though the plain-
tiff's had assigned their judgment and it had been satisfied by the
defendant the plaintiff could prosecute its appeal because it claimed
a sum in excess of that awarded.
1s Greenspot Desert Inns. v. Roy, 63 Cal. App.2d 54, 146 P.2d 39 (1944).
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fees and suit money.19 Following are some of the exceptions
adopted by other jurisdictions.
1. Right of Acceptance Conceded in Opponent's Petition
Most states hold that if the right to the judgment has been
conceded by the opposing party in his petition or complaint,
acceptance of the lower courts decision is not a waiver of the
right to appeal. If the plaintiff has put into issue only a liability
above a stated figure, the implied admission of liability for such
figure, thus made, will support the defendant in accepting this
amount waiving his right to review as to the amount in issue.
In Embry v. Palmer20 the plaintiffs had brought a proceeding to
enjoin the collection of a judgment against them for more than
a certain sum, on the ground that as to the balance the judgment
had been procured by defendant's fraud. The lower court
entered a decree as prayed for on condition that the plaintiffs
pay into court the amount admitted to be due. The plaintiffs
did so and the defendant drew out the money. The court held
that this did not bar the defendant from prosecuting a writ of
error, by stating:
It is sufficient for the present purpose to say that no waiver
or release of errors, operating as a bar to the further prosecution
of an appeal or writ of error, can be implied, except from conduct
which is inconsistent with the claim of a right to reverse the
judgment or decree, which it is sought to bring into review.
If the release is not expressed, it can arise only upon the principle
of an estoppel. The present is not such a case. The amount
awarded, paid, and accepted constitutes no part of what is in
controversy. Its acceptance by the plaintiff in error cannot be
construed into an admission that the decree he seeks to reverse
is not erroneous; nor does it take from the defendants in error
anything, on the reversal of the decree, to which they would
otherwise be entitled;' for they cannot deny that this sum at
least, is due and payable from them to him.21
'9 Dickenson v. Kallusch, 91 Cal. App. 141, 266 P. 816 (1928).
20 107 U.S. 3, 8 (1883).
21 Followed in Reynas v. Dumont, 130 U.S. 354 (1889) (which shows
the plaintiff may accept an amount admitted in the pleadings of
the defendant to be due as well as a defendant accepting an amount
admitted by the plaintiff to be due). The court stated; "The accept-
ance by appellants of what was confessedly theirs cannot be construed
into an admission that the decree they seek to reverse was not erron-
eous, nor does it take from appellees anything, on the reversal of the
decree, to Which they would otherwise be entitled." See also; Gior-
dano v. Height, 188 N.Y.S. 837 (1921) where it was held that the
plaintiffs acceptance of payment of the judgment for the undisputed
items admitted by the defendant is not a waiver of his right of appeal
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2. Right Admitted During Proceedings
If the right to a certain judgment is admitted during the
course of the proceedings the courts usually hold that acceptance
of such admitted liability does not constitute a waiver of the
right of appeal. For example, in Bethlehem- Steel Co. v. Mayo22
the claimant for workmen's compensation appealed from an award
of 50 per cent compensation for permanent partial disability to
his leg. The defendant having presented the issue as to whether
there was more than 50 per cent disability, it was held that the
court did not err in refusing to dismiss the claimant's appeal be-
cause of acceptance of payments based on the 50 per cent because
the right to the amount of the judgment accepted was conceded
by the opposing party, thus falling within an exception to the
general rule.
23
The voluntary payment by a defendant of a judgment against
him has apparently not been held sufficient admission of liability
of the amount to be included within this exception. However,
in Bass v. Ring24 the court held that the payment of a judgment
for part of the plaintiff's claim worked as a severance for that
part.
as to the other items because this would remain due the plaintiff
on any conceivable disposition of the appeal. See also; Brawand
v. Home Installment Co., 75 Or. 478, 147 P. 391 (1915).
22 168 Me. 410, 177 Atl. 910 (1935).
-3 See also Betleyoun v. Industrial Commission, 31 Ohio App. 53, 166
N.E. 378 (1927) where during the trial on appeal the defendant con-
fessed judgment for compensation at $15.00 per week for 2 weeks.
After judgment the plaintiff accepted the amount, and the court
held this was no bar to his prosecuting error. The court stated
that the claim of the plaintiff was divided into two parts, the ques-
tion of compensation for thirteen days following the injury, and the
question as to whether there was any further liability. Therefore
the plaintiff was entitled to receive $30.00 in any event. The court
said: "The receipt therefor by the plaintiff of the money which
was confessedly his could not of course, be construed as an admission
that the judgment which he attacks is not erroneous, as the amount
received was not in dispute, the judgment being attacked because
the plaintifff claimed he was entitled to a sum of money in addition
to that admitted to be due him." In Luglan v. Lenning, 214 Iowa 439,
239 N.W. 692 (1931) the defendant's had conceded that the east 40
of 30 acres attached by the plaintiff was subject to attachment, but
had defended as to the west 40. The lower court held that the attach-
ment was good on the east 40 but not on the west, and gave special
execution accordingly. It was held that the sale under this execu-
tion and the bidding in of the property by the plaintiff did not prevent
him from prosecuting his appeal.
24 210 Minn. 598, 299 N.W. 679 (1941).
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3. Acceptance Only of Minimum Due
Another exception to the rule has been applied if the nature
of the controversy is such that the party has received the smaller
of two amounts that he would be entitled to. This would be true
where the issue between the parties is as to which of two alter-
native theories governs their rights, and the sum accepted appears
to be a minimum due the accepting party under either theory.
For example, if the issue is as to the appellant's right to priority
payment out of a fund and the lower court gives priority to his
opponent, he is entitled to accept the surplus and still maintain
his appeal, because if the decision is reversed he will still be en-
titled to retain the amount of his then priority claim.25 Or, for
example, if a receiver's distribution where the sum was awarded
a creditor but the receiver was directed to retain an additional
sum claimed by this creditor, pending final determination of pro-
ceedings upon the claim of another of equal priority, it was held
no waiver of the right to appeal for such additional sum by ac-
cepting the lesser award.26 This exception is probably extended
the furthest in Cunningham v. Cunningham .2 7 In that case a
wife had asked for more alimony and, even though the appellate
court had power to modify any part of the decree, the court said
that the alimony award was not so large as to render it probable
that less might be allowed on a retrial making refund necessary,
and held there was therefore no waiver of the right to appeal.
The Nevada court's policy is that if it is not probable, though pro-
cedurally possible, that an amount awarded will be reduced, the
appellant brings himself under the rule that an acceptance of what
one is entitled to in any event will not bar his appeal for an ad-
ditional sum.
25 Funk v. Mercantile Trust Co., 89 Iowa 264, 56 N.W. 496 (1893). See
also; Nickle v. Mann, 210 Iowa 906, 232 N.W. 722 (1931) where the
debtor's property having been sold and the funds placed in the hands
of a receiver, an issue of priority was raised between the lessor
of the debtor and a chattel mortgagee. The amount of the mortgages
was greater than the fund and the lower court directed payment of
the rent as a prior claim. The mortgagee appealed and after the
appeal the court ordered the receiver to pay the balance on the mort-
gages. It was held that acceptance of this sum, did not constitute
waiver of the right to appeal. Followed in Eysink v. Jasper County,
229 Iowa 1240, 296 N.W. 376' (1941).
26 Merriam v. Victory Min. Co., 37 Or. 321, 56 P. 75, 58 P. 37, 60 P.
997 (1900).
27 60 Nev. 191, 102 P.2d 94, 105 P.2d 398 (1940).
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4. Review Legally Confined to Additional Amount
The right of appeal has usually been held to survive the ac-
ceptance of an amount that will not be put in jeopardy by the
review sought. This applies where the controversy raised by the
appeal or petition for review is legally confined to liability for
the additional amount claimed.28 Some courts hold this refers
only to a right which will not be put in jeopardy by the appellant's
own proceedings, it being immaterial that the right may be en-
dangered by a cross appeal, or cross assignment of errors.2 9 How-
ever, if the counterclaim is held not to be a separable matter, but
a mere claim in reduction of damages, the court will probably hold
that acceptance of the benefits bars the right to appeal.30
Where there is a certification of a question by the lower court
concerning the right of a plaintiff to certain items of an account,
acceptance of the amount of a judgment for the other items has
been held not to waive the right of appeal.3 1 The acceptance
of the principal sum under a judgment has therefore been held
not to bar the right of appeal upon a claim for interest,
32 costs,33
28 For example see City of Grand Rapids v. Bogoger, 141 Wis. 530, 124
N.W. 679 (1910) & Appleton Waterworks Co. v. Railroad Commission,
54 Wis. 121, 142 N.W. 476 (1913); In both cases the condemnee was
given the right of appeal for more damages than awarded by the
assessing agency under condemnation proceedings. The courts' held
that a right of appeal is not waived where the issue is limited by
law to the question of whether the damages should be increased. In
Shaffer v. Great American Indemn. Co., 147 F.2d 981, (5th Cir. 1945)
it was held that where the plaintiff had been awarded a sum for
total disability but denied a sum for partial disability under work-
man's compensation, he was not estopped from prosecuting an appeal
as to the partial disability by having accepted payment of the award
made. In Garvy v. Garvy, 324 Ill. App. 518, 58 N.E.2d 340 (1944)
it was held that a wife's acceptance of payments allowed her for
separate maintenance did not require a dismissal of her appeal for
an order allowing her payments from the date of her original petition,
rather than at the end of the trial courts decree.
29 See Fiedler v. Howard, 99 Wis. 388, 75 N.W. 163 (1898).
30 Mastin v. May, 130 Minn. 281, 153 N.W. 756 (1915).
31 Byran v. Polk County, 76 Iowa 75, 40 N.W. 102 (1888).
32 See Re Hubbell, 216 Cal. 574, 15 P.2d 503 (1932) where a legatee was
allowed the amount of his legacy and yet allowed to appeal for
error in denying him interest.
33 See Glock v. Elges, 39 Nev. 415, 159 P. 629 (1916) where it was held
that the acceptance by the plaintiff of the amount of the judgment
in his favor did not waive his right of appeal from the part of the
judgment denying costs.
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or a penalty, 34 if the appeal is legally limited to the latter claim.
Where an appeal is confined to a claim of error for reducing an
amount to which the party was previously entitled, the party is
not barred by acceptance of the reduced amount, if a further re-
duction cannot come into issue,3 5 and it has been held that the
additional amount sought by appeal after accepting the lessor
amount does not have to be a separable item.
3G
In Worthington v. BeemanY' it was held that where a plain-
tiff prayed for distinct causes of action on separate counts, pre-
vailed on only one count and collected judgment on it, he could
prosecute error as to the other count whether the judgment was
in one entry or separate entries.38
34 See Henderson v. Nixon, 66 Idaho 780, 168 P.2d 594 (1945) where
it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to accept the amount
of a judgment for the excess rent paid over that permitted by war-
time regulations, and yet appeal from the judgment in so far as it
denied the penalty imposed upon the defendant for charging the
excessive rent.
35 See Indianapolis v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 94 Ind. App. 211, 180 N.E.
497 (1931) where the appellant's ground of appeal was that the lower
court had no jurisdiction to make the reduction.
36 See Clarke v. Angelus Memorial Asso., 14 Cal. App.2d 750, 58 P.2d
974 (1936) where the plaintiff had recovered judgment against a
corporation upon a debt, and a judgment against a stockholder for
a percentage of the debt. Plaintiff appealed on the ground that
the statutes made the stockholder liable for a larger percentage,
and the court held that acceptance of the amount found due from the
stockholder was no bar to the appeal. See also; Schaeffer v. Ardery,
238 Ill. 557, 87 N.E. 343 (1909) and Hawkins v. Lake County, 302
Ill. 213, 134 N.E. 84 (1922) where the courts' hold that acceptance
of taxes by a collector will not bar his appealing for a higner valua-
tion. In Mudd v. Perry, 25 F.2d 85 (8th Cir. 1928) the court held
plaintiff could maintain an appeal for one half interest in an estate
notwithstanding he had accepted distribution of one-fourth interest
since that interest was not being controverted. [writ of certiorari
was denied in 278 U.S. 601 (1928)] There are contrary holdings
however. See, In re Baby, 87 Cal. 22, 25 P. 405 (1890); Turner v.
Markham, 152 Cal. 246, 92 P. 485 (1907) and Kellner v. Schmidt,
237 Ill. App. 428 (1925).
37 91 F. 232 (7th Cir. 1899).
38 The same result was reached in Peck v. Richter, 217 F. 880 (8th Cir.
1914) where it was held the plaintiff could maintain his appeal as to
the items not allowed where the action was for several items inde-
pendently contested. See also, Upton Mfg. Co. v. Huiske, 69 Iowa
557, 29 N.W. 621 (1886) and Altoona Say. Bank v. Pace, 195 Iowa
447, 192 N.W. 251 (1923) which reached the same result on notes
that were severally counted upon.
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The appeal itself was held to be divided in Goepel v. Kurtz
Action Co.39 where the complaint joined two causes of action,
(1) a claim for goods sold and delivered and for loss of profits
alleged to have arisen from a breach of the contract under which
the sales were made and (2) a claim for a balance due for other
goods sold. The trial court dismissed the complaint as to the loss
of profits, but entered a judgment on the other claims. Even
though the appeal was from the whole judgment, it was held that
the plaintiff's collection of the amount of the judgment did not
waive his appeal as to the claim for loss of profits, since the two
were separable. The appellate court, it was stated, should dismiss
the appeal from the part of the judgment which the plaintiff had
enforced, but entertain it as to the rest. It was emphasized that
if the plaintiff prevailed, the judgment would be reversed only
as to that part.40
The Federal Rule 41 states that the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment upon less than all the claims if there is no
reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment, but in other cases the adjudication of less than all the
claims is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judg-
ment.
The history of this enactment 42 shows that the rule was orig-
inally adopted in order to avoid possible injustice of a delay in
judgment of a distinctly separate claim required to await adjudi-
cation of the entire case. However some district courts made piece-
meal disposition of an action and entered what the parties thought
was a judgment, but when appealed, the finality of the partial
judgment was often put in question. Because of the confusion,
the Advisory Committee concluded that a retention of the older
Federal Rule was desirable, and that it was sufficient to grant
the judge discretionary power to afford a remedy in the infrequent
harsh case.
The principle of separable relief is often more difficult to en-
force in equity suits because the decrees are more complicated and
39 216 N.Y. 343, 110 N.E. 769 (1915).
40 See also; Huntington County State Bank v. Mason, 85 Ind. App. 320,
154 N.E. 20 (1926) where the court stated that ordinarily where sev-
eral mortgages are sought to be foreclosed in one proceeding, a sale
under the judgment of foreclosure as to one will not bar an appeal
as to the others.
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 54 (b).
42 See Notes of Advisory Committee concerning FED. R. CIV. P. 54 (b)
located in 28 U. S. C. A. p. 118 (1960).
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their provisions are more closely interrelated. However, the
rule is usually held to be the same, as in suits at law. For example,
ordinarily in a divorce action a wife cannot accept alimony pay-
ments and yet appeal from the decree if the appeal would take
up the main issue. But where the alimony awarded and accepted
was expressly confined to alimony for the support of a child, the
wife was not barred from appealing from the decree for denying
alimony for her own support.43
5. Acceptance of Prior Right Left Open by Adjudication
Where the benefits accepted are merely an enforcement of a
prior right, acceptance of such right which was not merged in
the judgment but was only recognized or confirmed by it will not
bar prosecution of appeal or error.44
6. Acceptance by Person Without Authority
A sixth exception carved from the rule is that acceptance by
a person without authority does not bar the right to appeal. An
attorney's acceptance of benefits is usually attributed to his client,
however, if the attorney has been discharged from the case his
clients should not be bound by such acceptance.4
Also if the parties repudiate the act of the attorney in drawing
out a sum paid into court and repay the amount drawn, it has
been held that the party has not waived his right of appeal.46 The
acceptance of benefits by a guardian, the party of record, for his
ward without the courts authority has also been held to be an ac-
ceptance by an unauthorized person.4 7
7. Acceptance in Trust or as Deposit
Where it appears that the money paid under a judgment is to
be held as a deposit or in trust to await the outcome of the appeal,
the acceptance does not waive the right of appeal. For example
in Matter of Petition of N. Y. & H. R. R.48 city land was taken
43 Coley v. Coley, 128 Ga. 654, 58 S.E. 205 (1907).
44 Farguharson v. Fresno Oil Co., 248 S.W. 481 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
45 Ruchman v. Alwood, 44 Ill. 183 (1867).
46 Jewell v. Reddington, 57 Iowa 92, 10 N.W. 306 (1881).
47 Hempstead v. Broad, 275 Ill. 358, 114 N.E. 120 (1916) & Ward v.
Williams, 278 Ill. 227, 115 N.E. 883 (1917).
48 98 N.Y. 12 (1885).
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by the railroad company. A statute provided the court should
direct the manner in which the money should be deposited by the
company and the court ordered the amount paid to the city cham-
berlain. It was held that the payment was intended to be held
as a deposit only, and that the city had not lost its right of appeal.
8. Expressed Lack of Intention to Waive
In most areas of the law, waiver rests on intention and volun-
tary choice, so some courts have held that an affirmative showing
by plaintiff in error that he did not intend to waive his appeal
is another exception to the rule.49
9. Reservation of Rights
It has been held that if money paid into court is ordered paid
to a party without prejudice to his right of appeal, his acceptance
of it will not operate against that right.50
If the circumstances imply that the party who pays the judg-
ment consents to a reservation of rights of appeal by the party who
acecpts the decree, it has been held that there has not been a waiver
of rights. In Lightner v. Greene County,51 it was held not a waiver
of the right to appeal, when a drainage assessment was accepted
by the board of supervisors, where the receipt given by them ex-
pressly reserved that right. This reservation of the right of appeal
can be preserved by implication as well as by expression. 52 Thus
if the acceptance is taken under protest, it has been held not a
waiver of right to appeal.5 3
40 Jones v. Pettingil, 245 F. 269 (1st Cir. 1917) (writ of certiorari denied
in 245 U.S. 663).
50 Chicago R. Equipment Co. v. National Hollow Brake Beam Co., 173
Ill. App. 595 (1912). Accord; Frankel v. Frankel, 41 Ariz. 396, 18
P.2d 911 (1933) (Appellant made a showing to the trial court that
she needed money to prosecute her appeal and obtained permission
to accept the amount deposited with the clerk without waiving her
right of appeal. Held: no waiver of such right.) See also: Smith
v. Zuta, 247 III. App. 203 (1928) where it was held the right to appeal
was not waived by the acceptance of attorney's lees ordered paid
and taken without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to appeal.
51 156 Iowa 398, 136 N.W. 761 (1912).
52 In Seattle v. Liberman, 9 Wash. 276, 37 P. 433 (1894) it was held
that a stipulation entered into under which the city was to distribute
part of the money, showed by implication that some of the distribu-
tees intended to appeal, so such right was not waived.
53 In Eakin v. Eakin, 83 W. Va. 512, 98 S.E. 608 (1919) it was held that
acceptance of money and notes returned to appellants from the trial
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10. Acceptance Under Compulsion
A few cases have held that need of money is acceptance under
compulsion, and not a waiver of the right of appeal. For example,
in Greenspot Desert Inns v. Roy 54 it was held that because of depres-
sion and war conditions, the rule as to accepting benefits would
not be enforced as the case came within the exception that accept-
ance of the judgment was involuntary since there was risk of
financial loss.
IV. PRESENT NEBRASKA LAW ON WAIVER OF
RIGHT TO APPEAL
A. NEBRASKA STATUTES
At the present time Nebraska has no statutes directly applying
to waiver of appeal. The Nebraska Constitutioni5 has been held
by the court to allow the defendant the right to exercise an appeal
after payment of a judgment, where it was not made voluntarilyr",
but the section has apparently not been applied to acceptance by
the plaintiff. A Nebraska statute57 suggests that the lower court's
judgment can be enforced in an action arising on contract for the
payment of money only, if sufficient security is given and the court
courts annulment of a sale of partitioned land under protest did not
bar the right to appeal. However for cases to the contrary see:
Clairview Park Improv. Co. v. Detriot & L.St. C. R. Co., 164 Mich.
74, 129 N.W. 353 (1910); Hyland v. Hogue, 131 Kan. 512, 292 P. 750
(1930) and Clothier v. Wallace, 137 Kan. 928, 22 P.2d 462 (1933).
-4 63 Cal. App.2d 54, 146 P.2d 39 (1944).
55 NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 24 states: "The right to be heard in all civil
cases in the court of last resort, by appeal, error, or otherwise, shall
not be denied . .. ."
56 See Burke v. Dendinger, 120 Neb. 594, 234 N.W. 405 (1931) where
payment after a judgment was held not to waive the right of appeal,
because the payment was made to avoid the sale of the defendants
property and thus was not made voluntarily. Contra - School Dist.
No. 65 v. McQuiston, 163 Neb. 246, 79 N.W.2d 413 (1956).
57 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1934 (Reissue 1956) states: "In an action arising
on contract for the payment of money only, notwithstanding the exe-
cution of an undertaking to stay proceedings, if the defendant in error
or appellee give adequate security to make restitution in case thejudgment is reversed or modified, he may upon leave obtained from
the court below, or a judge thereof in vacation, proceed to enforce the
judgment. Such security must be an undertaking executed to the
plaintiff in error by at least two sufficient sureties, to the effect that
if the judgment be reversed or modified, he will make full restitution
to the plaintiff in error or appellee of the money by him received
under the judgment."
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gives leave. However, here again the law applies to a defendant,
not to a plaintiff.58
B. NEBRASKA CASE LAW
Nebraska adopted the basic rule in 1881 in Hamilton County v.
Bailey19 where the court held that a claimant waived his right to
appeal by accepting a warrant in payment of an account filed with
the board of county commissioners.6" In the case of Harte v. Cas-
tetter1 the rule was somewhat broadened when the court held that
a partial acceptance of the benefit of the lower court's decision
would waive the right of appeal. 62
58 See Burke v. Dendinger, supra note 56. Bodewig v. Standard Cattle
Co., 56 Neb. 217, 76 N.W. 580 (1898).
G9 12 Neb. 56, 10 N.W. 539 (1881).
60 The court in this case said: "Where an account is filed with the
board of county commissioners, and allowed in part, and a warrant,
drawn for the sum thus allowed, is accepted by the claimant, he
therefore waives his right of appeal.... He cannot accept the amount
awarded to him by an order of judgment, and thereby receive the
benefit of the same and appeal from such order or judgment." This
rule was quoted with approval in Western v. Falk, 66 Neb. 198, 92
N.W. 204 (1002). See also, Gray v. Smith, 17 Neb. 682, 24 N.W.
340 (1885).
01 38 Neb. 571, 57 N.W. 381 (1894).
02 The court stated: "The doctrine that a party who accepts the bene-
fits of a decree in his favor waives the right to prosecute an appeal,
is not limited in its application to those alone who have accepted the
full amount awarded, but applies as well where there has been
part acceptance. A party, by voluntarily accepting under a decree
a portion of the amount found due him, thereby as fully and com-
pletely recognizes the validity of the decree as if he had drawn the
full amount allowed him. If appellant desired to prosecute his appeal
he should not have accepted any portion of the fund paid into
court, which was adjudged to be his. He was not compelled to accept
the money, but could have allowed it to remain with the clerk of
the district court until his appeal was decided. The acceptance of
the money, under the circumstances disclosed by this record, precludes
appellant from challenging the correctness or validity of the decree."
This rule was quoted with approval in McKee v. Goodrich, 84 Neb.
479, 121 N.W. 577 (1909) in answer to the contention that the rule
did not apply in the case because plaintiff only enforced so much
of the judgment as was in his favor. The court held that the plain-
tiff may enforce the judgment so far as it benefits him, but if he
recognized its validity to that extent, he cannot question any part
of it. Here the validity of the decision was recognized only by accept-
ing costs. The quote was also cited with approval in Larable v.
Larable, 128 Neb. 560, 257 N.W. 520 (1935) and Tunison v. Millsap,
112 Neb. 722, 201 N.W. 151 (1924). See also, Snyder v. Hill, 153 Neb.
721, 45 N.W.2d 757 (1951).
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The Nebraska court has not been confronted with all the excep-
tions listed, however, it has approved at least four of them. The
first exception - Right of Acceptance Conceded by Opponents
Petition - has been adopted by Nebraska in Meade Plumbing,
Heating & Lighting Co. v. Irwin63 where the court held that an
acceptance of an amount admitted in the answer did not constitute
waiver of the right of appeal.
The second exception - Right Admitted During Proceedings -
was adopted in Nebraska in First Trust Co. v. Hammond 4 where
it was held that if benefits are conceded, as where the defendant
did not ask for affirmative relief, did not offer any testimony that
she had any claim upon the property, and took no appeal, the
plaintiff will not be held to have waived his right of appeal by
accepting the benefit of the lower court's decree. The court cited
the rules of the Harte65 and Larabee"6 cases and then stated:
But these rules do not take into account those situations
wherein the benefits are conceded. The rule of this court in
such situations is the following; 'The rule is well settled that
one cannot accept or secure a benefit under a judgment, and
then appeal from it, when the effect of his appeal may be to
annul the judgment.... It is the possibility that his appeal
may lead to a result showing that he was not entitled to what
he has received under the judgment appealed from that defeats
his right to appeal. Where there is no such possibility, the right
to appeal is unimpaired by the acceptance of benefits under
the judgment appealed from.' Weston v. Falk, 66 Neb. 202,
93 N.W. 131, Meade Plumbing, Heating and Lighting Co. v. Irwin,
77 Neb. 385, 109 N.W. 391.67
The fourth exception - Review Legally Confined to Additional
Amount - has been accepted by the Nebraska court. In 1909 the
court held that a party who by execution collects so much of a
judgment for costs as are in his favor waives his right to bring
error from the part thereof against him. 68 " However, this decision
has been overruled. In Hoesly v. Dept. of Roads & Irr.09 it was
held that the owner of condemned land did not loose his right to
63 77 Neb. 385, 109 N.W. 391 (1906).
64 139 Neb. 546, 551, 298 N.W. 144, 147 (1941).
65 Supra note 61.
66 128 Neb. 560, 259 N.W. 520 (1935).
67 The above rule was cited with approval in Dove v. School Dist. No.
23, 166 Neb. 548, 90 N.W.2d 58 (1958).
68 McKee v. Goodrich, 84 Neb. 479, 121 N.W. 577 (1909).
69 143 Neb. 387, 9 N.W.2d 523 (1943) a rehearing of Hassly v. Dept. of
Roads & Irr., 142 Neb. 383, 6 N.W.2d 365 (1942).
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prosecute error by having accepted an amount based upon a plan
which failed to include a stock pass, because it appeared that the
amount he accepted was absolutely due him. And in Nuss v. Nuss7 °
the parties had accumulated an estate which stood in the name of
the plaintiff. At the trial however, the court relieved the plaintiff
of its control, ordering that court costs be paid out of the estate.
There was no judgment or decree in favor of the defendant, but
his court costs amounted to $4.00. The court held that this was
not an acceptance within the meaning of the rule.
Nebraska has also followed the sixth exception - Acceptance
by Person Without Authority. In First Trust Co. v. Hammond7 '
the court held that a guardian had no authority to bind his ward's
estate by accepting part of the personal property claimed and
thus constitute waiver of the right of appeal, without the courts
consent.
The Nebraska court has not considered the third, fifth, seventh,
or eighth exceptions, but has suggested that it will not follow the
ninth, and tenth. In Thurston v. Travelers Ins. Co.72 the court
indicated that it would not accept - Reservation of Rights - as an
exception to the rule, stating that a waiver of appeal can be accomp-
lished by appellant even if there is an agreement that the accept-
ance of payment should not affect his right of appeal.
It is suggested by way of dicta in State ex rel. Heintz v. County
of Adams7 3 that Nebraska would not follow Greenspot Desert Inns
v. Roy 74 and this can probably be taken for the proposition that
Nebraska would not follow the tenth exception - Acceptance
Under Compulsion.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
It is submitted that Nebraska should adopt a statute similar
to the following:
When the appellant gives adequate security to make
restitution in case the final judgment is reversed or mod-
ified, he may upon leave obtained from the court below,
or a judge thereof in vacation, proceed to appeal from the
70 148 Neb. 417, 27 N.W.2d 624 (1947).
71 Supra note 64.
72 128 Neb. 141, 258 N.W. 66 (1934).
73 162 Neb. 127, 75 N.W.2d 539 (1956).
74 Supra note 54.
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judgment after accepting the benefits therefrom. Such
Security to be executed to the court shall cover the amount
of the judgment accepted plus court costs, so that if the
judgment be reversed or modified, or a judgment is given
on a cross claim or cross appeal, the court will be able to
make full restitution to the appellee of the money adjudi-
ciated to him under such reversal, modification or judg-
ment.
If the above statute was enacted and the appellant required
to follow it, there is no reason to hold that he cannot accept the
lower court's judgment and still appeal. There would be no waiver
or estoppel, there would be no inconsistency of action, and the
defendant would be protected from injury. This would cause
less coercion on the plaintiff to forgo appeal from an unjust result,
as the plaintiff would be allowed the use of money he is in all
probability entitled to, and he would not be required to risk the
possibility that defendant will become insolvent during appeal.
Which of the situations discussed would be controlled by the
statute? The first five exceptions would usually be outside the
scope of the statute because the right appealed from is a different
right from the one accepted. Thus there has been no waiver, estop-
pel, or inconsistency and if there is no possibility of a cross claim
or cross appeal where on final judgment the defendant's claim
should be balanced against the plaintiff's, there is no reason to
require compliance with the statute. However, if the situation is
such that there may be a cross appeal or cross claim the bond
should be required and the statute followed.
The sixth and seventh exceptions should be adopted without
requiring compliance with the statute if the benefit received is
returned or available to the court so a defendant will not be injured
on reversal, as here again there has been no waiver, estoppel, or
inconsistency of action.
Under the eighth, ninth, and tenth, exceptions the courts should
require compliance with the statute to protect the appellee from
a possible reversal or modification. These exceptions are based
upon the whims of the plaintiff, and even though in many cir-
cumstances the appellant has not waived his right to appeal, or
estopped himself from so pleading, the underlying principle of in-
consistency and the possibility of harm to the appellee are still
present.
The right to appeal, however, should not be set aside except
upon clear and decisive grounds, and if the court upon reversal
can restore both parties to their respective rights, there is no
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reason to hold that the right of appeal has been waived. As sug-
gested in the statute, under a proper exercise of discretion, with
the requirement of a bond conditioned on the result of the appeal,
a plaintiff should be able to reserve his right of appeal.
Duane L. Mehrens, '61
